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The Taft-Hartley Acte has been in effect since 1947. During the
intervening 28 years companies have had the federal right, under sec-
tion 301 of the act,' to sue labor unions for damages because of wildcat
strikes. Unfortunately, the experience has taught those involved a plain
lesson. Such suits are always hard cases, but they make worse law.
In recent months, the federal courts have provided some notably
fine examples of this lesson. The Eighth Circuit, in Wagner Electric
Corp. v. Local 1104, IUE, takes a free-wheeling approach which,
however much the particular result is justified, threatens to destroy
the delicate balance of management, union, and individual rights which
protect us all from industrial warfare. The Pennsylvania district court
opinion on which the Eighth Circuit relies, Eazor Express, Inc. v.
IBT,4 graphically illustrates the problem. Eazor threatens ifnions with
vast damage liability for reluctance to use the "politics of power," rather
than the "politics of persuasion ' in dealing with wildcatting members.
Paradoxically, such decisions narrow the unions' path to rectitude so
drastically as to give unions a Hobson's choice among financial ruin,
economic warfare, and violation of individuals' rights.
The Sixth Circuit, fortunately, has taken a more realistic view in
North American Coal Corp. v. Local 2262, UMW,' as has the Third
* B.A. 1967, J.D. 1970, Ph. D. 1973, The University of Michigan; Assistant General
Counsel, UAW. The views expressed here are the author's, and do not necessarily rep-
resent those of the UAW.
1 'aft-Hartley Act (Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-
44, 151-67, 171-87 (1970).
229 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organiza-
tion representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in
this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any
district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without
respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties.
Id. § 185 (a).
S496 F.2d 954 (8th Cir. 1974), aff'g 361 F. Supp. 647 (E.D. Mo. 1973).
4357 F. Supp. 158 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (liability), 376 F. Supp. 841 (W.D. Pa. 1974)
(damages).
5357 F. Supp. at 167.
11497 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1974).
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Circuit in Penn Packing Co. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, Local I95.7
It may even be hoped that the budding heresy of Eazor will be pinched
off by the Third Circuit. Even so, some careful attention to this area
today will save a good deal of future misery on both sides of the labor
relations fence.
MANAGEMENT RESPONSES TO A WILDCAT STRIKE
It is relatively rare for a wildcat strike8 to rcsult in a full-blown
section 301 damage action. The employer is typikally content with a
Boys Market' injunction and a speedy resumption of production. Dis-
charge or discipline of the key strikers, where necessary, is regarded as
adequate protection against repeat performances.
Restricting the remedy to an injunction and discipline is a sensible
result for both management and the union. With well-known excep-
tions," employers are interested in production and profits, rather than
ideology. They want the plant to produce, not only well, but predictably.
A wildcat strike does more than stop production; it introduces uncer-
tainty into "the quiet life" of the business and casts doubts where none
belong. The closely integrated supply and distribution systems of in-
dustry presume predictability. A business with a reputation for labor
problems, let alone wildcats, simply cannot provide its customers with
that predictability.
A Boys Market injunction buttressed by discipline meets the em-
ployer's dual needs. The injunction restores production quickly. The
union is unlikely to contest its issuance, for fear o:t ratifying a breach
of the no-strike clause in the labor agreement. The considerable au-
thority and power of the federal courts is the eriployer's protection
against escalation of the conflict. Thus contained, the underlying dis-
pute is returned to a predictable forum-negotiation and arbitration.
Xrhile discharges and discipline may aggravate the situation, their
susceptibility to negotiation and arbitration is -, ell understood. A
union can normally tolerate a Boys Market injunction and defend dis-
charged strikers without long-term injury to a stable collective bargain-
ing relationship.
7497 F.2d 888 (3d Cir. 1974), aff'g 85 L.R.R.M. 2022 (E.D. Pa. 1973). See also
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Teamsters Local 633, 88 L.R.R.M. 2785 (1st Cir. 1975), rev'g 87
L.R.R.M. 2308 (D.N.H. 1974).
8 The term "wildcat strike!' normally means a work stoppage which is in violation
of either: (1) a no-strike clause in the collective bargaining agreement; (2) the rules,
by-laws, and constitution of the union; or (3) both. Unless otherwise indicated, I use
the term in the third sense.
0 Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
10 See, e.g., W. UPHOaF, KoHLER oN SInE: THiRTY Ymuis oF CoNFLlcr (1966).
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Where a damage action is filed, it'is most often used as a bargain-
ing lever. The chance of major liability, however remote, can persuade
unions to compromise their grievances. This is especially true of im-
pecunious unions, particularly locals, who are dealing with a single
tentacle of a major conglomerate. Litigation itself can be a serious
financial burden.
There are important practical reasons for stopping here, and not
going the "full route" with a section 301 damage action. The most
obvious is that such an employer irrevocably commits himself to a death
match with the union. The company will either destroy the union with
the litigation, or the union will break the company at the next round of
negotiations. Meanwhile, civilized labor relations will disappear without
trace or memory.
A less obvious reason is that a section 301 Armageddon necessarily
involves detailed discussion of an employer's most intimate financial
secrets. By making a damage claim, the employer puts its financial in-
jury, and thus its finances, at issue in the litigation. The discovery rules
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure1 give the union and its ac-
countants the right to explore every corner of the employer's books.
If the union conducts its case properly, it will know everything from
per-unit profit to the finer details of management compensation. The
employer may withdraw parts of the damage claim in an effort to limit
the investigation; but it can expect little success, given the liberality of
the discovery rules. It it a relatively simple matter for a union ac-
countant to demonstrate how the unexplored area could be used to ex-
aggerate damages. Nor does it stop with the plaintiff's business. Where
transfers to related business entities are possible, the union will delve
into the related entity. If there is a possibility of misstatement by
suppliers or customers, plaintiff will find the union subjecting those
parties to process and investigation. Understandably, few employers
want to run the full length of this particular gantlet.
It is easy to see, then, why section 301 damage suits are hard cases.
It is less easy to explain why they generate bad law. The absence of an
adequate analytic framework is the most probable cause, as we shall
see.
THE SECTION 301 LAWSUIT
Analysis of these cases must begin with the no-strike clause in the
labor agreement. The point is so obvious that it is frequently over-
" FED. R. Crv. P. 26-37.
[Vol. 50:-472
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looked. A section 301 action is for simple breach of contract, so one
must start with the language of the contract. To be sure, a no-strike
clause may be implied.12 But, unless the no-strike obligation is voluntarily
assumed, it simply does not exist." In Canada, for example, there are
statutory prohibitions against strikes during the term of a collective
bargaining agreement.' 4 There need not be a no-strike clause, except in
Ontario where the law requires one be inserted in every labor agreement.
In the United States, the Supreme Court has expressly rejected this
approach. 5 One should, then, expect U.S. courts to approach these cases
with the familiar contract analysis: Is there a contract? Given the
language of the agreement, what is the scope of the contractual obli-
gation? Has there in fact been a breach of that obligation, either by
action or inaction? If there is a breach, has it been cured by subsequent
union action; or, perhaps, excused by the employer's failure to mitigate?
Of course, labor agreements are hardly garden-variety contracts.
They are a breed apart, and must be applied with an eye to the practi-
calities of the bargaining relationship. That relationship, as well as the
union and employer that function within it, is fenced about with a
number of important federal policies. The obvious one is the preser-
vation of industrial peace. However, there are others of equal impor-
tance: the elimination of discrimination," the duty of fair representa-
tion, ' 7 the preservation of union democracy and membership rights, 8
and the exclusive representation principle," to name a few. In its most
recent section 301 case,2" the Supreme Court warned against "free-
12 Local 174, IBT v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 105 (1962).
13 Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 382 (1974) : "Thus, an arbitration
agreement is usually linked with a concurrent no-strike oblig,.tion, but the two issues
remain analytically distinct. Ultimately, each depends on the intent of the contracting
parties."
24 CAN. REv. STAT. ch. L-1, §§ 128, 129(1), 130 (1970); ALTA. Rv. STAT. ch. 96, §
101(1) (1970); B.C. REv. STAT. ch. 205, § 54(1) (1960); MAr. REv. STAT. ch. L 10, §
26(1) (1970); N.B. REv. STAT. ch. 124, § 21 (1952); NEwF. REv. STAT. ch. 191, § 23(1970); ONt. REv. STAT. ch. 232, § 63(1) (1970); Pa. ED. Is. REv. STAT. ch. 164, §
13(1) (1951); QuF. REv. STAT. ch. 141, § 95 (1964).
1' Local 174, IBT v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 105 n 14 (1962) : "Insofar as
the language of [the state supreme] court's opinion is susceptible to the construction that
a strike during the term of a collective bargaining agreement is ipso facto in violation of
the agreement, we expressly reject it."
'See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-15 (1970) ; 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
'7 See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
'8 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-15 (1970).
1' 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970); Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Com-
munity Org. (WACO), 95 S. Ct 977 (1975); NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. 175,
180 (1967).20 Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Jt Exec. Bd., Hotel Employees Union, 417
U.S. 249, 255 (1974).
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wheeling" disregard for congressional policies:
In Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), this
Court held that § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
authorized the federal courts to develop a federal common law re-
garding enforcement of collective-bargaining agreements. But
Lincoln Mills did not envision any free-wheeling inquiry into what
the federal courts might find to be the most desirable rule, irrespec-
tive of congressional pronouncements. Rather, Lincoln Mills makes
clear that this federal common law must be "fashion[ed] from
the policy of our national labor laws." Id., at 456.21
As we shall see, recent damage cases under section 301, particularly
Eazor,22 are guilty of ."free-wheeling." They abandon the contract an-
alysis in favor of general policy pronouncements; then are guided by the
single policy of industrial peace, ignoring important countervailing
policies.
Recent months have seen the development of three general ap-
proaches to the problem of union damage liability under section 301.
Some cases have resulted in immense liability, often of union-busting
proportions. 3
At one extreme is Judge Teitelbaum's decision in Eazor. Eazor
has been followed in approach, but perhaps not detail, by the Eighth
Circuit in Wagner Electric Corp. v. Local 1104, IUE.24 This approach
requires a union to escalate its intervention through all reasonable
means, both persuasive and punitive, in order to end the wildcat. The
focus is solely on the policy of industrial peace.
At the other extreme is the Sixth Circuit's North American Coal
Corp. v. Local 2262, UMW, 5 which expressly rejects Eazor. Relying
on equally general propositions, the Sixth Circuit holds that there can
be no liability unless there was union initiation, authorization, or en-
couragement of the wildcat.
21d. at 255.
22 Eazor Express, Inc. v. IBT, 357 F. Supp. 158 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (liability), 376
F. Supp. 841 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (damages), discussed supra notes 3-4 & text accompany-
ing.
23The damage awards against all union defendants in these cases are as follows:
Eazor, $512,001.32; Adley, currently at trial on damages; Wagner Electric, $70,000;
and Penn Packing, no cause of action. In a sister case to Adley, IBT Local 107 suffered
a judgment of $970,000, which was subsequently compromised. Roadway Express, Inc. v.
Highway Truck D. & H., Local 107, 299 F. Supp. 1058 (E.D. Pa. 1969). It is fashion-
able to assume that all unions are rich. With the exception of a few large International
Unions, however, most unions and their locals are impecunious by most, let alone com-
mercial, standards.
24496 F.2d 954 (8th Cir. 1974).
25 497 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1974).
[Vol. 50:-472
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The third approach is that of Penn Packing Co. v. Amalgamated
Meat Cutters, Local i95,26 a Third Circuit opinion, and Adley Express
Co. v. Highway Truck Drivers & Helpers, Local 107, 7 an opinion by
Judge Becker of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. These decisions
turn first to the language of the no-strike clause. The standard to be ap-
plied is drawn from a realistic reading of that cause, in light of the
range of pressures and policies which impinge on collective bargaining.
Whether a breach exists, and whether it has been cured or excused, is
resolved as an issue of fact, not as one of law. Penn Packing distin-
guishes Eazor and Wagner Electric without eithcr approving or dis-
approving them.
THE NARROWING PATH: THE E;,ZOR
AND WAGNER ELECTRIC APPROACH
Eazor and Wagner Electric
The labor agreements in Eazor contain provisions which from a
union's point of view, are considered fairly favorable. The no-strike
clause is typical of Teamsters' Union (IBT) agreements. However,
express language excuses the unions from liability for wildcat strikes,
provided they make an "immediate effort" and use "every reasonable
means" to end the strikes.2"
Eazor begins reasonably enough, remarking that the task of the
court is to interpret the agreements.2" However, the court uses only two
guides in its interpretation: the employer's expectation of uninterrupted
production, and the public policy against employee'3 doing individually
2 6497 F.2d 888 (3d Cir. 1974).
27 349 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
21 The contract in Eazor provided:
The Union and the Employers agree that there shall be no strike, lockout, tie-up,
or legal proceedings without first using all possible means of settlement, as pro-
vided for in this Agreement of any controversy which might arise.
357 F. Supp. at 161. However, other provisions limit and speci-y the duty owed: "The
Union shall not be liable for damages resulting from [an un-.uthorized strike] of its
members. . . . [T]he Union shall undertake every reasonable means to induce such
employees to return to their jobs during any such period of unauthorized stoppage of
work. . . . [T]he Central States Drivers Council shall not be liable for any strike,
breach or default .... unless the act is expressly authorized by iis Executive Board ....
Council shall make immediate effort to terminate any strike or 3toppage of work which
is not authorized by it without assuming liability therefor." TDrief for IBT to Third
Circuit at 3-4; Eazor, 357 F. Supp. at 162. Eazor involves the Further issue of whether
the International Union itself is even a party to the labor agreerr ent and/or the no-strike
provision. Id. at 167-68. This sort of issue often arises in IBT and UMW cases; but
for purposes of this discussion I am assuming that the unions inx olved are clearly parties
to the no-strike clause.
20 Id. at 164.
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what they cannot do as a union." On that basis, Eazor implies an
obligation on the unions "to use all reasonable means at their disposal,
both persuasive and punitive, to terminate the work stoppage."', The
Eazor decision leaves no latitude for good faith union judgments as to
what might, or might not, be productive.82 To escape damage liability,
holds Eazor, the union' should have: suspended or expelled strikers
from membership; prevented them from getting jobs elsewhere; denied
use of union facilities and hiring halls; imposed daily fines; removed
local leadership from office; held all votes by secret ballot; and trusteed
the Locals involved.88 The court does not require that these steps be
taken immediately. Rather, it envisions an escalation from persuasion,
through various punitive actions, until, like Indochinese guerrillas, the
wildcatters capitulate to superior force.8" If necessary, the union is re-
quired to deplete its punitive arsenal.88 That the strikers are ugly and
violent, Eazor reasons, makes all the more imperative the need for "the
politics of power rather than the politics of persuasion."88
In Wagner Electric, the union was sued for breach of a typical
no-strike clause. 7 There was some evidence of union instigation, al-
though union involvement fell short of authorization.88 Relying on the
"mass action" cases" and Eazor, the Eighth Circuit adopted the unquali-
fied proposition that "a union is required to use its best efforts to return
striking workers to their jobs if it is not to be held responsible for their
so Id. at 164-65.
81376 F. Supp. at 843.
82 357 F. Supp. at 168 n.18: "The obligation is not discretionary, but mandatory.
Therefore it leaves no latitude for political or even good faith judgments as to what
might and what might not be productive."
28 357 F. Supp. at 166-69.
84 376 F. Supp. at 848-49.
85 357 F. Supp. at 169; 376 F. Supp. at 843.
86 357 F. Supp. at 167. One can easily imagine the union's surprise at learning the
sweeping nature of the no-strike obligation it voluntarily assumed. This is particularly
true of the International Union, which did nothing to sanction, authorize, aid or comfort
the strikers. Id. at 168.
87Wagner Electric Corp. v. Local 1104, IUE, 361 F. Supp. 647 (E.D. Mo. 1973),
aff'd, 496 F.2d 954 (8th Cir. 1974). "The Union agrees that during the term of this
Agreement there shall be no strikes . . . , stoppage of work, or any other form of in-
terference of production or other operations .... " 361 F. Supp. at 648.
88 Id. at 650.
89 These cases accept the proposition that a union is liable for the "mass action" of
its members. The key mass action case is Vulcan Materials Co. v. USW, 430 F.2d 446
(5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 963 (1971). In the context of a suit under section
303 of the Taft-Hartley Act for a secondary boycott, the Fifth Circuit held that a union
is responsible for the mass action of its members as long as it is a functioning entity. In
this, the Fifth Circuit was reasserting a proposition going back to United States v. UMW.
77 F. Supp. 563, 566 (D.D.C. 1948), aff'd, 177 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338
U.S. 871 (1949). As we shall see, the "mass action" principle is often and easily mis-
applied in the section 301 area.
[Vol. 50.472
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actions."'" Following Eazor, the Eighth Circuit focused on general prin-
ciples. Applying those principles, the court affirmed the district court's
holding that the union's press release ordering a return to work did not
toll union liability.
Construction of the No-Strike Clause
A major problem with the Eazor approach is that the duty it
imposes on the union is so severe that, despite disclaimers to the con-
trary, it cannot reasonably be inferred from the agreement. Eazor
does not suggest that the union intended to be bound by such an obliga-
tion. The analysis is not in terms of the intent of the contracting parties,
but in terms of a particular view of federal labor policy. The case does
not involve the inference of a no-strike clause from the existence of an
arbitration provision." In Eazor the labor agreements contained de-
tailed no-strike clauses. Those provisions, more than most, evidence an
intent not to subject the union to damage liability for wildcats. They
are, for instance, considerably more favorable to the union than the
"agree and guarantee" language found in Penn Packing," where it was
held that the union did not intend a no-fault indemnity promise."
The thrust of Eazor is that no revision of the no-strike clause will
effectively limit a union's exposure. A union's intent in agreeing or in
applying the agreement is irrelevant. Or, if relevant, it cannot withstand
court-imposed inferences drawn from a one-sided view of federal labor
policy. The Eazor court, for practical purposes, wrote a Canadian no-
strike statute into U.S. labor law. This is a serious misunderstanding
of the law. The authority to rewrite labor agreements has been denied
the NLRB, since to allow it would ignore "the fundamental premise on
which the [National Labor Relations] Act is based-private bargaining
under governmental supervision of the procedure alone, without any
official compulsion over the actual terms of the contract."' 4 Given the
Supreme Court's proscription of "free-wheeling" in Howard Johnson,4"
the federal courts certainly have no greater authority under section 301
40 496 F.2d at 956.
41 Local 174, IBT v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 105 (1962).
42 "The Union for itself and for its individual members agrees and guarantees that
there shall be no strike, stoppage of work, slowdown, or other interference with produc-
tion." Penn Packing Co. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, Local 195, 497 F.2d 888, 890
(3d Cir. 1974).
43 Id.
44H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 108 (1970), quoted with approval in
NLRB v. Burns Security Services, 406 U.S. 272, 287 (1972).
4 Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Jt. Exec. Bd., Hotel Employees Union, 417
U.S. 249, 255 (1974). See notes 20-21 supra & text accompanying.
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to ignore such a "fundamental premise."
The proper approach is to construe no-strike promises, like the rest
of labor agreements, by realistic assessment of the intent of the parties.
This is precisely what the Third Circuit did in Penn Packing, the "agree
and guarantee" case." But it is precisely what the Eighth Circuit failed
to do in Wagner Electric. Even if the result in Wagner Electric is
correct, its approach is not. There is no discussion of whether the parties
intended the "best efforts" standard, under which an order to return to
work did not toll liability. Instead, the Eighth Circuit, citing Eazor,
treats the standard as a matter of settled labor law. 7 The court thus
opens the way for future decisions to disregard intent, and follow Eazor
in institutionalizing the "politics of power." Ironically, the Eighth
Circuit itself recently reversed a section 301 decision in another area
for just such an "unrealistic" approach to labor agreements."
The Limited Nature of Union Authority
Another major problem with the Eazor approach is that its ren-
dition of federal labor policy is simplistic and, in major respects, flatly
wrong. Eazor assumes that unions have plain authority to revoke
membership, impose fines, suspend local officials, prevent employment
elsewhere, and otherwise punish wildcatters.
The authority is hardly plain. A member of a collective bargaining
unit has no legal obligation to sign a union membership card. The
obligation of union membership, even under a union shop agreement,
is purely financial.49 However, in the absence of union membership, a
union has no authority to impose, discipline.5"
Even where the striker is a card-carrying member, section 8(b) (2)
of the National Labor Relations Act5 makes it unlawful for a union
46497 F.2d at 890-91.
4 Wagner Electric Corp. v. Local 1104, IUE, 496 F.2d 954, 956 (8th Cir. 1974).
48IBT v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 488 F.2d 738 (8th Cir. 1973), reversing the dis-
trict court's interpretation on the ground that the Supreme Court "require[s] federal
courts to place a practical and realistic construction upon labor agreements, giving due
consideration to the purpose which they were intended to serve." Id. at 742.
49 NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742-43 (1963).
50 NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 184-85 (1967).
51 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2) (1970):
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-
(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an
employee in violation of subsection (a) (3) or to discriminate against an em-
ployee in violation of subsection (a) (3) of this section or to discriminate
against an employee with respect to whom membership in such organization has
been denied or terminated on some ground other than his failure to tender peri-




to enforce membership obligations in a manner which prejudices joli
rights. Wildcat strikers are not protected against employer action by
section 7 of the NLRA. "2 They may be discharged by their employer,
the industrial equivalent of capital punishment. Arbitration decisions
which tamper with such discharges have had worse-than-average luck
withstanding judicial review."3 Unlike the union, the employer has a
recognized right to prejudice employment rights. A Boys Market in-
junction, in addition, will bring the considerable auth1ority and power of
the federal courts to an employer's aid. The union's "arsenal" has
nothing remotely comparable or uncontestable.
To be sure, union constitutions do give authority to fine and dis-
cipline members. However, that authority is ill-suited to the role which
Eazor sets out for it. It is too closely fenced alout with legal and
practical restrictions.
Practical Restrictions on Union Power
The practical restrictions are well-known. 4 Mo3t unions are demo-
cracies by tradition. The rest are so by Act of Congress." Rival
political factions are to be expected, as is disagreement with union leader-
ship. Such disagreements are likely to be most pronounced and intract-
able when, as in a wildcat, tempers run high. Ever where no factions
existed before a work stoppage, the wildcat is like!ly to create them.
The chances of this happening typically increase as the perceived
"pro-management" action of the union leadership increases. Extreme
action of the sort required by Eazor, then, tends to fractionate union
strength at precisely the wrong time. For this reason, Razor is particu-
larly mistaken in excluding good-faith union judgments about the prob-
able effectiveness of its actions. As the Supreme Court recently recog-
5 See, e.g., Lee A. Consaul Co. v. NLRB, 469 F.2d 84, 85 ('Oth Cir. 1972).
53 See, e.g., Amanda Bent Bolt Co. v. UAW, Local 1549, 451 F.2d 1277 (6th Cir.
1971) ; Local 342, UAW v. T.R.W., Inc., 402 F.2d 727 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 910 (1969).
54 Gould, The Status of Unauthorized and "Wildcat" Strikes Under the National La-
bor Relations Act, 52 CoRNL.L L.Q. 672, 701-02 (1967) :
As a matter of good sense, there are very sound reasons fo," a narrow concept
of union liability. The union bargains for all employees in ,.n appropriate unit,
but it does not necessarily have the loyalty of all employees Even in a union
shop, the willingness to follow union leadership on economic questions, as well
as matters of discipline of individual employees, may be of varying degrees and
intensity . . . . [Tihere may be groups within the unit %x hich are hostile to
the bargaining agent. Such groups may contain a contending faction or mem-
bers of a rival union which would like to have the incumbent --posed to liability.
Moreover, an employer-sponsored strike is certainly not beyond the realm of
possibility.
IlLandrum-Griffin Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 481-83 (1970).
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nized, "the principle of exclusive representation is meant to lubricate"
the collective bargaining process.56 Factionalism thins that lubrication,
making the probability of strife and deadlock high, and the likelihood
of headway minimal." Both employer and union suffer from such an
approach.
Legal Restrictions on Union Flexibility
(1) Landrum-Griffin Limitations
The legal restrictions on a union's ability to comply with Eazor are
even more serious. Eazor forgets that the membership rights which the
union is to deny are protected by Title I of the Landrum-Griffin Act. 8
No court has yet held that wildcat strikers, ipso facto, lose all protection
under Title I. I seriously think such a result would find much accept-
ance. Yet without it, a union can follow Eazor only at a distinct risk
of having to defend membership suits brought under section 102 of
Landrum-Griffin. 9 Certainly the provisos to sections 101(a) (1),
101(a) (2), and 101(a) (4), which allow unions to adopt and enforce
"reasonable rules," give the union some defense."0 But most unions will
be understandably reluctant to invite prolonged litigation in order to
prove that its action was pursuant to "reasonable rules." The fate of a
union whose constitution contains no such rules, or whose internal rules
are too limited,8" is another matter altogether. Short of ultra vires
action by the leadership, unions may seek to avoid Eazor by revising
their constitutions to further limit the range of allowable union disci-
56 Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org. (WACO), 95 S.
Ct. 977 (1975).
57 Id. It should be noted that union officials are particularly ill-suited, by tempera-
ment and training, to be strike-breakers. Employer discipline is likely to be administered
with a much more willing hand than union discipline.
58 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-15 (1970).
59 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1970).
80 Section 101(a) (1) assures equal rights to all members, "subject to reasonable
rules and regulations in such organization's constitution and bylaws." 29 U.S.C. §
411(a) (1) (1970). Section 101(a) (2) gives the rights of free speech and assembly,
provided that "nothing herein shall be construed to impair the right of a labor organiza-
tion to adopt and enforce reasonable rules as to the responsibility of every member to-
ward the organization as an institution and to his refraining from conduct that would
interfere with its performance of its legal or contractual obligations." 29 U.S.C. §
422(a) (2) (1970). Section 101(a) (4) protects the right of a member to sue his union,
subject to an exhaustion of internal union remedies requirement. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (4)
(1970). Section 101(a) (5) gives the member a federal right to written specific charges,
reasonable time to prepare, and a full and fair hearing before a union may use discipline.
29 U.S.C. § 411(a) (5) (1970).
81 It is common, for example, for a union constitution to limit severely the amount
of fine which can be imposed by a trial board on a member.
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pline against wildcat strikers.62
The first proviso to section 101(a) (4) properly requires the in-
dividual member's complaint to be directed internally, even where it
arises out of a union's action in the strike context. Analogizing to
section 101(a) (4), the Ninth Circuit, in a duty o' fair representation
case, has held that a union member must initially pursue internal union
procedures to remedy such union action." This requirement may well
solve the dispute by internal means. But, when the plaintiff is bitter,
it merely delays his recourse to the courts for four months.
The due process protections of section 101(a) (5) are not quali-
fied by proviso. Literally, they require written notice, preparation time,
and hearing even for the wildcat striker. On its face section 101 (a) (5)
forecloses the sort of short-circuited disciplinary procedures suggested
by Eazor.
The courts, notably the Fifth Circuit, have held that appointed
union officials can be summarily removed for disobedience."4 This ac-
cords with the established rule that section 101 (a) (5) protects member-
ship rights, not the right to hold office.65 However, Eazor contemplates
denial of membership, not just union office. Membership rights have the
full protection of section 101 (a) (5).
In light of recent decisions, moreover, there is increasing doubt
about a union's authority to remove an offender from office. Some argue
that the Fifth Circuit's Sewell0 decision, which uptolds this authority,
should be limited to appointive office. But the recalcitrants in a wildcat
62 1nternational Bhd. of Boilermakers, I.S.B.F. & H. v. -ardeman, 401 U.S. 233,
242-44 (1971), precludes judicial determination of the scope o offenses warranting a
union's discipline of its members.
1-3 Buzzard v. Lodge 1040, 1AM, 480 F.2d 35, 41 (9th Cir. 1973).
C4 Sewell v. IAM, 445 F.2d 545, 550-51 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1024
(1972):
This conclusion, however, does not permit an employee who accepts employ-
ment . . . to take the largesse and pay of the union, on ore hand, and, on the
other, to completely subvert the purposes of his employmmt by engaging in
activities diametrically opposed to the performance of his specified duties ....
To permit an individual to accept union employment, to receive union pay, and
to enjoy the prestige of a union position, while spending his employer's time
opposing the plans and policies he was employed to execute, would in our judg-
ment, be unreasonable.
See also XVambles v. IBT, 488 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1974) (appointed official can be dis-
charged without cause).
65 Wood v. Dennis, 489 F.2d 849, 854 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 960
(1974); Martire v. Laborers' Local 1058, 410 F.2d 32, 35 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 903 (1969) ; IAM v. King, 335 F.2d 340, 341-43 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
920 (1964) ; Airline Stewards v. TWU, 334 F.2d 805, 808-09 (7th Cir. 1964), cert denied,
379 U.S. 972 (1965); Sheridan v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 306 F.2d 152,
155 (3d Cir. 1962).
60 Sewell v. IAM, 445 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1971).
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are likely to be elected Local officials. Moreover, if removed from office,
both appointed and elected officials may argue that their removal was
not for promoting a wildcat. Rather, they can easily claim it is a reprisal
for the exercise of Title I membership rights, e.g., their opposition to the
leadership's position on the substantive bargaining matters which led
to the strike. Reprisal for the exercise of Title I membership rights
is actionable under' section 609 of Landrum-Griffin.67 The Second
Circuit's recent decision in Schonfeld v. Penza68 holds that section 609
reprisal claims for removal from office are sometimes actionable, despite
the fact that under Title IV of the Landrum-Griffin Act " the Secretary
of Labor has exclusive jurisdiction over violation of candidacy and
office-holding rights. In Calhoon v. Harvey,0 the Supreme Court held
that officeholders and candidates cannot avoid the statutory pre-emption
of Title IV by pleading the case as a Title I action. Schonfeld's rationale
for not applying the Calhoon pre-emption rule is that a union official
is sometimes given the choice of his office or his membership rights,
and in appropriate circumstances section 609 requires that officials not
be put to such a choice because of the chilling effect such a choice has
on membership rights. 1 The Seventh Circuit, in two decisions," has
limited the Schonfeld exception to the Calhoon pre-emption rule to
cases involving a lengthy history of intra-union warfare. However,
the Seventh Circuit accepts the basic premise of Schonfeld that Calhoon
does not entirely foreclose section 609 suits for removal from office.
The way remains open, then, for union officials to bring section 609
suits against unions who remove them from office in the manner re-
quired by Eazor. It remains to be seen whether the Seventh Circuit's
restrictive reading of Schonfeld will be accepted. But whether it is or
not, the developing liberalism in the section 609 area threatens to play
"rock" to Eazor's "hard place," with unions caught between.
Title I and section 609 problems aside, the Eazor approach also
forgets that the law of section 501 of Landrum-Griffin" has been ad-
vancing. Section 501 imposes fiduciary duties on all union officials, and
section 501 (b) gives union members a right of private derivative action
67 29 U.S.C. § 529 (1970).
68 477 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1973).
69 29 U.S.C. §§ 481-83 (1970).
70 379 U.S. 134, 194-95 (1964).
71 The Third Circuit itself has adopted a position similar to Schonfeld. Martire vr.
Laborers' Local 1058, 410 F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1969).
72 Driscoll v. IUOE, Local 139, 484 F.2d 682, 688 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 960 (1974); Wood v. Dennis, 489 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
960 (1974).
7329 U.S.C. § 501 (1970).
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against union officials for breach of that duty. It is easy to forget that
section 501 deals with more than finances. None other than the Eighth
Circuit, in Johnson v. Nelson,74 held that section 501 (a) requires union
officers to obey the orders of the membership. In fact, the Eighth Cir-
cuit's decision in Pignotti v. Local 3, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n,"5
found a breach of section 501 in an International Union's use of a
trusteeship to make a Local act contrary to a vote of its membership.
A union can be scissored between this line of section 501 cases and
Eazor. Presumably a union official could, under court order, safely 8
disregard a membership order. But such decisions by union officials are
usually made without such protections. Sometimes no-strike clauses
are unclear. A membership may take one reading and order a strike,
despite the doubts of the leadership. Eazor would, in such a case, force
the leadership to choose between the risk of major section 301 damages,
and the risk of a section 501 (b) action by his mernbership. The choice
will not be any easier when the official realizes that he must pay for the
defense of a section 501 (b) suit out of his own pocket. Since section
501 actions are derivative, ordinarily union lawyers are disqualified."
(2) The Union's Duty of Fair Representation
In addition to practical restrictions and Landrum-Griffin, fair rep-
resentation and anti-discrimination law can constrain a union's latitude
to deal with wildcatters.
The judicially-evolved duty of fair representatfon requires a union
to act with good faith and honesty."8 Anything less-for example,
negligence-does not state a claim." However, in some circumstances
arbitrary or perfunctory handling of the grievance can subject the union
to fair representation liability."0 Expansion of the "arbitrariness" prong
74325 F.2d 646 (8th Cir.), aft'g 212 F. Supp. 233 (D. Minn. 1963). judge Larson's
opinion below contains an exhaustive discussion on the relevant legislative history.
7r, 477 F.2d 825 (8th Cir. 1973).
71 Protection from a successful section 501 (b) action is one thing. Protection from
the voters at the next election is quite another. The latter pro cection is, of course, be-
yond any court's authority.
77 Yablonski v. UMNV, 454 F.2d 1036, 1041-42 (D.C. Cir. 1071).78 Amalgamated Ass'n of S., E.R. & Motor Coach Employ cs v. Lockridge, 403 U.S.
274, 299-301 (1971); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967) ; H--Iumphrey v. Moore, 375
U.S. 335 (1964).
70 See, e.g., Dente v. International Org. of Masters, M. & P., Local 90, 492 F.2d 10,
12 (9th Cir. 1973) ; Hubicki v. ACF Indus., 484 F.2d 519, 526 (3d Cir. 1973) ; Lewis v.
Magna American Corp., 472 F.2d 560, 561 (6th Cir. 1973).
,0 Griffin v. UA'V, 469 F.2d 181, 183 (4th Cir. 1972) ; Retana v. Apartment, M., H.
& Elevator Operators Union, Local 14, 453 F.2d 1018, 1023-24 (9th Cir. 1972); De
Arroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 231, 284 (1st Cir. 1970).
See generally Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61
CALM. L. REv. 663 (1973). It should be noted that the Sixth Circuit has limited Griffn,
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of fair representation raises doubts about a union's ability to make the
compromises essential to reach a middle ground between a wildcatting
membership and an incensed employer. The difficulty is particularly
acute where the employer demands a "horse trade," that is, the sacrifice
of a few individuals as the price for rescinding the discharges of many.
Fair representation suits are increasing in number. Their defense is an
expensive, time-consuming burden on unions. Eazor is an incentive for
a union either to short-shrift fair representation, or to avoid com-
promises often necessary to cut short the wildcat and prevent its re-
occurrence. Eazor, in short, promotes the worst solution-litigation.
(3) The Requirements of Antidiscrimination Law
An analogous dilemma can arise because of the federal statutes
forbidding race and sex discrimination. Recent developments under
Title VI1" and section 198182 have made a union's good faith in remedy-
ing discrimination less and less relevant. Particularly in the depart-
mental seniority cases, where statistical discrimination exists, damage
liability is assessed on practically a strict liability basis.8"
Where the wildcatters are women or members of a minority group,
the Eazor approach narrows the path to rectitude considerably. A wild-
cat and the resulting discharges can undo years of affirmative action.
Even if individual discrimination suits are successfully defended, the
union can be left with markedly less defensible statistics on minority and
female population. Title VII and section 1981 seemingly require a full-
blooded defense of the affected class, if only to preserve defensible
statistics. Eazor threatens the union with damage liability for the same
defense.
The problem is even more complicated where the work stoppage
itself is directed at discrimination. Prior to the Supreme Court's
reversal of Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community
Organization," the District of Columbia Circuit, in Laborers Inter-
national Union, Local 478 v. NLRB,85 held that the Laborers violated
supra, to its facts, Johnson v. IBT, Local 89, 488 F.2d 250, 257 (6th Cir. 1973).
8142 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-15 (1970).
8242 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
83 Meadows v. Ford Motor Co., 510 F.2d 939 (6th Cir. 1975); Pettway v. American
Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974) ; Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974) ; United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906,
921 (5th Cir. 1974); Head v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870, 876-77 (6th
Cir. 1973) ; Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 474 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. granted,
95 S. Ct 654 (1974) ; Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
81 95 S. Ct 977 (1975), rev'g 485 F.2d 917 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
85 Laborers' Int'l Union, Local 478 v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 192 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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section 8(b) (1) (B) of the NLRA88 by bargaining for the appointment
of black foremen. The Laborers unsuccessfully argued that Title VII
required this sort of action, as racist foremen are frequently the source
of a discriminatory atmosphere. And, I might add, such foremen are
the usual spark, if not the main cause, of race-related wildcats. If a
wildcat strike occurs, the employer, through its exclusive control over
the selection of supervisors, retains practical control 7 over the key to
settlement. The insensitivity of the Eazor approach gives the employer
a means to squeeze the union between section 301 damage liability and
an unfair labor practice.
The Supreme Court's decision in Emporium puts Laborers in doubt
and answers some questions about the job action directed at discrimina-
tion. It is now clear that the exclusive representation principle of section
9(a) of the NLRA88 precludes fragmentation of the bargaining unit
along racial lines.8" At least, those who attempt it are not protected by
section 7 of the NLRA.9 But the Court carefully reserves the question
of whether members of the affected class have a Title VII remedy
against the union and the employer.9 Emporium offers little comfort
to a union forced by Eazor to choose betwen Title VII and section 301
liability. At best, it establishes that wildcatting for antidiscriminatory
reasons is not a section 7 right. 2
UNION LIABILITY: AN ISSUE OF FACT OR LAW?
The "Vicarious Liability" Approach
I turn now to the third and final problem with the Eazor and
Wagner Electric approach. Wagner Electric, in particular, treats union
liability for the mass action of its rank and file rrembers as a settled
matter of law, rather than an issue of fact. 3 It imposes, not the agency
8029 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1) (B) (1970).
8 7 Theoretically, a union might also file a discrimination suit or argue the employer
has failed to mitigate damages.
18 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
89 95 S. Ct. 977, 989.
9029 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
9195 S. Ct. at 989.
That does not mean that the discharge is immune from attack on other statutory
grounds in an appropriate case. If the discharges in this case are violative of
§ 704(a) of Title VII, the remedial provisions of that title provide the means by
which Hollins and Hawkins may recover their jobs with back pay.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). The Court does not disclose what is "an appropriate case."
02 Of course, Emporium itself involved a boycott picket, not a full-fledged wildcat.
93 Wagner Electric Corp. v. Local 1104, IUE, 496 F.2d 954, 956 (8th Cir. 1974):
However, it is well established that a union is responsible for the mass action
of its rank and file members as long as it is a functioning entity . ...
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rules intended by Taft-Hartley, but a strict rule of vicarious liability.9'
The contrast among the three approaches to the application of
section 301 to wildcats"' can be seen most clearly on this issue. The
Sixth Circuit approach in North American Coal Corp. v. Local 2262,
UMW 0 rejects the vicarious liability approach in strong terms:
It has been clear to Congress for many years that imposition
upon unions of vicarious liability for the unauthorized acts of in-
dividuals could easily mean the elimination of labor unions as a
social institution in America. The clearest expression of Congres-
sional concern is, of course, the Norris-LaGuardia Act and, specifi-
cally, Section 6 thereof.
Irresponsible or violent acts by individual workers (or by
agents provocateur) if automatically attributable to the union on the
scene could, of course, serve to destroy it. But such vicarious
liability is repugnant to due process of law. And this circuit has
repeatedly recognized that unions may only be held responsible for
the authorized or ratified actions of [their] officers and agents 7
In requiring authorization or ratification as the condition of union
liability, the Sixth Circuit readopted its Blue Diamond Coal9" position,
which accords with the Fourth Circuit's famous Haislip Baking9
opinion. The Sixth Circuit does not overstate the danger of a vicarious
liability standard to unions as institutions, as the foregoing hopefully
demonstrates.
The Sixth Circuit's assessment of the legislative intent behind
section 301 is equally accurate. Section 301, particularly section
301 (e),' was designed, as Senator Taft freely admitted,' to sub-
Neither does the issuance of an exculpatory press release absolve a union
of liability for the violation of a no-strike provision. A union is required to
use its best efforts to return striking workers to their jobs if it is not to be held
responsible for their actions.
94 In'the first Eazor opinion, the court declined to follow the vicarious liability cases.
357 F. Supp. at 163 n.7. However, a note to the second Eazor opinion adopts the vi-
carious, "mass action" theory as an alternative ground for the holding on liability. 376
F. Supp. at 843-44 n.1.
95 To repeat, these are: (1) the Wagner Electric and Eazor approach; (2) the
North American Coal approach; and (3) the Penn Packing and Adley approach.
11 497 F.2d 459 (6th Cir. 1974), discussed supra note 25 & text accompanying.
97 Id. at 466-67 (footnote omitted).
98 Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. UMW, 436 F.2d 551, 556 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 930 (1971).
s9 United Construction Workers v. Haislip Baking Co., 223 F.2d 872, 877-78 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 847 (1955) : "The question is not whether they [the union]
did everything they might have done, but whether they adopted, encouraged or prolonged
the continuance of the strike." Of similar import is Yale & Towne Mfg. Co. v. Local
1717, IAM, 299 F.2d 882, 884 (3d Cir. 1962).
10029 U.S.C. § 185(e) (1970) :
For the purposes of this section, in determining whether any person is act-
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stitute common law agency rules for the standard of United Brother-
hood of Carpenters & Joiners v. United States,"0' which required "clear
proof" of union authorization. It was hardly intended to impose strict,
vicarious liability on unions for wildcats. Instead, Congress confirmed
the employer's right of discharge as the appropriate remedy.'
The "Mass Action" Agency Theory
Wagner Electric's "mass action" agency theory is drawn from two
sources. There, the court puts primary reliance on Vulcan Materials
Co. v. USW,1'0 a secondary boycott case under section 303."'5 But this
reliance overlooks the unique purposes of section 303. Section 303 gives
a damage remedy for strikes which are unfair labor practices under
section 8(b) (4) of the NLRA."'0 It is designed to give an innocent
third party a damage remedy against a union that, ir. violation of federal
statute, puts that innocent party in the middle of a labor dispute. Argu-
ably, this policy justifies the rule in Vulcan Materials that "as long as
a union is functioning as a union it must be held responsible for the
mass action of its members.' 0 2 ' The section 301 damage suit, however,
involves no such policy. The strike violates, not a statute, but a con-
tractual no-strike provision.' Unlike the secondary employer, the
primary employer has its own weapons to use again3t the wildcat strike.
It can discharge and discipline the wildcatters. The Eighth Circuit's
uncritical reliance on Vulcan Materials forgets all these factors.
Wagner Electric puts secondary reliance on the D.C. Circuit's
venerable United States v. UMW °9 and cities, as further support, Adley
Express Co. v. Highway Truck Drivers & Helpers, Local 1o7,11 ° decided
ing as an "agent" of another person so as to make such othur person responsible
for his acts, the question of whether the specific acts performed were actually
authorized or subsequently ratified shall not be controlling.
0193 CONG. REc. 4022, 6858 (1947).
102 330 U.S. 395 (1947).
103 E.g., Senator Taft's summary, 93 CoNG. REc. 6442, 6858 (1947). In this, the Con-
gress was merely approving NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332, 344 (1939). Taft-
Hartley added the language "or to affect the limitations or qu difications on that right
[to strike]" to section 13 of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1970). The employer's right
to discharge wildcatters is one of the "limitations" preserved by this amendment.
104430 F.2d 446, 455 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 963 (1971).
105 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1970).
10829 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (1970), which makes it an unfair labor practice for a
union to engage in a secondary boycott.
10T 430 F.2d at 455.
108 In Canada, where the no-strike prohibition is statutory, p-2rhaps Vulcan Materials
would be apposite.
1077 F. Supp. 563, 566 (D.D.C. 1948), af'd, 177 F.2d 29, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 871
(1949).
110 349 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Pa. 1972), cited, 496 F.2d at 956.
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by the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
Wagner Electric relies on United States v. UMW as if the
"mass action" rule is a settled matter of law. But Adley itself explains
why such an approach is mistaken. Adley does not require authoriza-
tion as a sine qua non as does the Sixth Circuit's North American Coal.
Nor does it forget the importance of authorization. For that reason it
offers a third approach to North American Coal, on the one hand, and
Wagner Electric and Eazor on the other.
Working from a typical no-strike clause,"1 Adley reaffirms the
proposition that a union can be liable for a stoppage which it in fact in-
stigates, regardless of whether the name "strike" is attached or whether
the formal requirements of union authorization have been met. Adley
treats union responsibility for the mass actions of its members as an
issue of fact, rather than law.112 For this reason, Adley expressly re-
fuses to hold a union strictly and vicariously liable, even where it in-
stigates a wildcat, "regardless of any unsuccessful effort it may make to
terminate it.""' To cut short its liability, "the Union has the burden of
demonstrating that it exerted very substantial and sincere efforts to get
the men back to work. ... I The court holds that further evidence is
needed to determine whether the union's importuning at a certain mem-
bership meeting amounts to such efforts." 5
The Adley reading of United States v. UMW is not only correct,
but it supplies the sensitivity lacking in Wagner Electric and Eazor.
Union damage liability for wildcats is a matter of the intent of the
parties and the facts. This is not an area amenable to general recitation
of "settled" principles.
Approaching Union Liability as an Issue of Fact
There is a sensible approach to this area. If the parties must litigate,
the court must begin-as the Third Circuit did in Penn Packing"-
with a realistic reading of the no-strike clause. It is simply not sensible,
"' "The Union and the Employers agree that there shall be no strike, lockout, tie-up
or legal proceedings without first using all possible means of a settlement as provided for
in this Agreement, of any controversy which might arise." Adley Express Co. v. High-
way Truck D. & H., Local 107, 349 F. Supp. 436, 439 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
12Id. at 443-44.
I's Id. at 444.
11 Id.
315 Contrast the Eighth Circuit's dismissal of the union's "back to work" press re-
lease in Wagner Electric, 496 F.2d at 956, and the district court's similar treatment, 361
F. Supp. at 651.




absent extraordinary circumstances, to read no-strike clauses as imposing
much more than: (1) a duty not to authorize or instigate a wildcat;
and (2) a duty to use a union's best persuasive efforts to end the work
stoppage as soon as possible.1 7 Insofar as the Si:xth Circuit, in North
American Coal, suggests that the second part of tl-is duty cannot exist,
its conclusion is overstated.
The next issue is whether the union formally, or in fact, authorized
the wildcat. This is an issue of fact. Where the no-strike clause may
be violated by less than formal authorization, the question is whether
mass action, in the given circumstances, forces the inference of union
authorization or instigation. Such an inference is never logically neces-
sary. Nor should it be as lightly drawn as, for example in the section
303 area, where policies and employer remedies are quite different. If
there is authorization or instigation, the union's d~Lmage liability starts
running.
Where there is no authorization or instigation, union liability arises,
if at all, from the sort of inaction which can only be explained as ratifi-
cation of the breach. While section 301 (e) requires less than clear
proof of actual ratification, it would be anomalous, using a ratification
theory, to hold a union liable on weaker evidence than required to support
an inference of authorization. The agreement sometimes lists what
union action rebuts an inference of ratification. Where that action is
taken, liability ought not accrue. Nor can there be liability before ratifi-
cation can be reasonably found.
Once liability is running, the question is when it stops. Obviously,
a return to work ends the breach. But short of that, the union effort
required ought to be the "substantial and sincere" persuasive efforts re-
117The plaintiff contends that the wording in this clause makes the union liable
for any loss to the employer caused by work stoppage whether authorized by
the union or not-what might be called a "no fault" duty of indemnity on the
part of the union.
The district court reasoned that to impose such an unvsual obligation, very
explicit language in the contract would be required. We a ree with this inter-
pretation.
The costs of wildcat strikes are apt to be high, a fact of which employers
are keenly aware, but which is certainly not unknown to union officials. Under-
standably, employers are anxious to secure all the protection possible to prevent
such losses and, if possible, to secure indemnity. It is most ,anlikely that a union
would shoulder such a large risk without clearly stating its intention to do so.
Id. at 890-91. The Third Circuit held that no guarantee was intended, and that all the
union agreed to was "to use its best efforts to end the stoppage as soon as practicable."
Id. at 891. The union had urged a return to work, and offered to pay the salaries of dis,
charged stewards, pending arbitration. This was adequate to affirm judgment for the
union.
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quired by Adley.118 Where earlier union instigation or authorization
must be undone, perhaps the efforts have to be more vigorous. But the
punitive approach of Eazor cannot be defended, even where there is
authorization from the onset. The balance of conflicting federal policies
is too delicate, the realities too complex, for so blunt an approach.
118 Adley Express Co. v. Highway Truck D. & H., Local 107, 349 F. Supp. 436, 444
(E.D. Pa. 1972).
